On the Ethical, Moral and Pragmatic Justification of Political Decisions

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What is a reasonable understanding of different forms of justification and to what extent are these applicable to the processes leading up to political decisions? In what ways are the nature of political decisions of relevance for justification, and what role could morality play in the shaping of these political decisions, in particular in relation to the reasons provided as argument regarding engagement in peacebuilding in states’ foreign policy? In order to address these questions this article makes use of the concepts of justification and to some extent legitimation of political decisions and action. In particular, it discusses a distinction between pragmatic, moral and ethical justification, and legitimation. It is argued that pragmatic justification implies a political or strategic approach towards the decision that is to be justified, while moral justification concerns the rightness or wrongness about the reasons for the political decisions. Ethical justification, on the other hand, concerns the principles governing the decisions. In this article, it is argued that these need to be understood on different levels. The position argued for in the article is based on a Kantian approach towards justification of political decisions, and builds on reasoning by Immanuel Kant, Jürgen Habermas and Rainer Forst. This assists putting an emphasis on the role of humans as rational beings, as well as the principles governing the arguments used for taking decisions on getting involved in peacebuilding. Based on the reasoning throughout the article, I defend an understanding where arguments for political decisions in foreign policy primarily should be understood as attempts toward pragmatic and moral justification.

Keywords: ethical, moral and pragmatic justification, attempts to justify, legitimation, political decisions

This article is devoted to an exploration of different forms of the notion of justification and, in particular, the applicability of these forms to arguments provided for political decisions. The following addresses questions such as what a reasonable
understanding of different forms of justification is as well as their potential applicability to political decisions. In what ways are the nature of political decisions of relevance for justification, and what role could morality play in the shaping of these political decisions, in particular in relation to the reasons provided as argument regarding engagement in peacebuilding in states’ foreign policy? Is it reasonable to talk about different forms of justification? It is essential to already from the beginning of the text make clear that conceptual clarification is crucial, as this to a large extent is framing the reasoning in this article. The aim of the article is to address how an adequate justification of political decisions should be understood, arguing that a position which combines descriptive realism and normative non-realism is preferable. In doing this, the ambition is to bring conceptual clarity to the application of the concepts of pragmatic, moral and ethical justification, in particular in relation to external states’ justificatory attempts of their engagements in peacebuilding as examples of political decision.

The article articulates conceptions of justification which are of relevance for assessing the arguments provided for political decisions and actions. An important question concerns the role of morality in political reasoning and decisions, as well as whether there are differences between ethical, moral and pragmatic justifications in relation to political decisions. Here, the discussion turns to Immanuel Kant and his concepts of the moral politician and the political moralist, and its applicability to state-representatives attempts to justify political decisions. Another central issue here is how an adequate justification of political decisions should be understood. The understanding argued for in the article largely builds on the right to justification, i.e. the theory of justice offered by Rainer Forst. Forst’s normative theory of justification is the core of the discussion, and it is critically assessed and developed. The focus on Forst’s reasoning positions the article in a Kantian tradition as focus lies on rationality, and the rational human being providing reasons for her decisions. In the Forstian terminology, she is providing justifications, enhancing the right to justification and its reciprocal and general nature. This additionally positions the discussion within the realm of critical theory, i.e. in the nexus between philosophical reflection and empirically based social science informed by an interest in emancipation. The article also addresses the potential connection between justification and legitimation as it relates to the practices of articulating arguments for political decisions. There seems to have been a tendency to mix the concepts of justification and legitimation, which risks blurring our understanding of them.

There are several aspects in need of clarification. I will proceed with an explanation of what kind of political decisions focused on here and who the actors articulating the arguments for these decisions are. This is followed by a discussion of justification in relation to epistemology of political decisions, with the aim to distinguish whether justification is applicable to the type of political decisions in the spotlight here. The article proceeds with a discussion of pragmatic, moral and

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ethical justification, and clarifies how this is connected to our understanding of ethics and morality. Before a discussion of how justification could be understood it seems plausible to explicate what kind of political action that is central here, this warrants taking the nature of political decisions as a starting point.

**On the nature of political decisions**

For the purpose of arguing for a position where morality has a role to play in the argumentation leading up to political decisions, it makes sense to more closely discuss the nature of political decisions. Within previous research, at least two approaches toward the role of morality within politics could be identified: realism and constructivism. Scholars arguing for a realist understanding would state that morality has no, or a very slim role in politics. This reasoning is articulated by scholars such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Edward Carr and George Kennan and could arguably be understood as a combination of rationalism, moralism, and legalism⁴. On the other end of the spectrum, constructivists⁵ would argue that moral arguments do have a role to play within the realm of politics. This line of reasoning is for example found in the works of scholars such as Kathryn Sikkink, Kimberly Hutchings and Carl-Henric Grenholm⁶. On this spectrum, I position myself in the constructivist end. The position I defend acknowledges descriptive realism on a political level in that it sees national interest as the primary goals for states. Importantly, it is non-realistic on a normative level, allowing for moral arguments having a role to play in political reasoning⁷. What becomes clear here is the need to differentiate between the descriptive and normative levels. Here I argue in line with Grenholm that within ethics as a critical discipline, the task for the reasoning on a descriptive level is to describe and clarify the different ideas that exist. The task is also to explicate the arguments provided for and against different positions. The normative level in relation to ethics is, on the other hand, supposed to design and formulate better and

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⁵ This has been labelled differently in the literature, partly depending on which approach you take. Others have used the wordings of idealist, utopian or moralist reasoning for capturing the arguments in favor of ethics and morality having a role to play in political reasoning. See: Donnelly J. The Ethics of Realism // The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. P. 8.


more thoughtful suggestions for models trying to assess morality. I conclude that this gives us at least two disciplinary entries here: the one from ethics, but also the one from politics (or political science/theory). This paper is written within the discipline of ethics, but it focuses on the reasoning leading up to political decisions, clearly relating it to politics. The tension between ethics and politics has been addressed by many, one prominent example being Kant’s discussion on the moral politician and the political moralist published in his seminal Perpetual Peace, a publication which has had a vast influence on the international system we have today.

Let us dwell a bit more on the Kantian legacy of the reasoning building up this article by addressing Kant’s distinction between the moral politician and the political moralist, which I argue is of relevance here. These metaphors are suggestively to be seen as a general distinction between duty and expediency. Kant argues that the moral politician will always act upon the following principle:

If certain defects which could not have been avoided are found in the political constitution or foreign relations of a state, it is a duty for all, especially for the rulers of the state, to apply their whole energy to correcting them as soon as possible, and to bringing the constitution and political relations on these points into conformity with the Law of Nature, as it is held up as a model before us in the idea of reason; and this they should do even at a sacrifice of their own interest.

Kant argues in favor for the moral politician, and states that it is only by following the moral rules politicians could make politics aiming towards peace. What is crucial is the free will and Kant’s conviction that the laws of nature and history can bring about the necessary conditions of worldwide justice. However, only the free choice of human beings in a position to influence national and international affairs can add the sufficient condition for the realization of such justice, which is a fundamental demand of morality. It is the people adopting this influential position who Kant calls moral politicians. Only moral politicians will decide always to observe articles of world peace, as articulated by Kant in the First section containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace between states. These actors will do this consistently, and not merely when seeming to do so is in their own short-term interest but when really doing so is in the long-term interest of everyone throughout the world.

Kant’s reasoning about moral politicians, always taking decisions in line with a strive towards world peace, and the political moralist, putting her own interests first, could possibly be seen as ideal types of persons in the nexus between ethics and

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9 Kant I. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. P. x.
10 Ibid. P. 166.
11 Important to note here is that Kant’s position on moral duties is that they are categorical and not hypothetical. This implies that moral duties have to be respected, but that hypothetical imperatives are conditional. In addition, it is not the consequences that are of moral importance, but rather the motive or the intention behind our actions. We are obliged to act in certain ways regardless of your wishes.
politics. These metaphors are used to explain in what way morality is a necessary part of politics, but also in what ways politics is connected to morality. It could also be seen as Kant’s explanation of why perpetual peace can only be reached through reason, as opposed to force or political expediency. I argue that it could be understood as it is towards this background that the Forstian reasoning on justificatory orders could be applicable for the practices state-representatives find themselves in leading up to decisions on engagements in peacebuilding initiatives.

For Forst, human practices are closely connected to the practice of providing reasons, or rather, justifications for our actions, decisions and choices. Given that this is obvious, it is equally unsurprising that others would be expected to do the same regarding their practices. This supports the assumption that actors provide reasons for their practices, and as I argue here, also in relation to political decisions in states’ foreign policies. In addition, the political social context is, according to Forst, equivalently a normative order of justification. I argue that the states’ discourse on foreign policy offers an order of justification. This order governs our lives through norms and institutions in a justifiable way. Orders of justification are always bound by questions of justice and power, where justice is understood as the absence of domination and power as the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done.

It is further on assumed that political decisions are usually preceded by some kind of contemplation, deliberation or discussion regardless of what kind of context the decision is formed within. Here I reason in line with Kurt Riezler, in that “[…] any action that can be said to have direct or indirect political consequences, intended or not, may be called political”.

I view this in the light of Forst’s reasoning of the ‘political’ comprising of a social context where people inhabit an order of justification. This includes institutions and norms which regulate coexistence in a justified or justifiable way. I also delimit myself to focusing on power-holders, which could be an individual or a collective but who is ruling a political community, in the examples I am focusing on here this equivalents representatives of a state. Further, it seems reasonable to assume that different political systems allow different amounts of deliberation in their processes leading up to a decision. In a functional democratic system it seems plausible to argue that the deliberative process is more extensive than in a dysfunctional democratic or, towards the end of that spectra, a totalitarian system. Yet, even if a political decision could be made by an authoritarian dictator, it seems intuitive to assume that also this person considers different options before taking a decision. It is the reasons leading up to a decision that is of interest in this article. Given the Kantian position I adopt, it is central with the rationality of human beings. This

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13 Kant I. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. P. 178.
19 This is also in line with the reasoning of Riezler K. Political Decisions in Modern Society. P. 1.
is also emphasized in Forst’s reasoning and his view of human beings as being endowed with reason, i.e. being rational, but also social and political creatures\textsuperscript{20}. Rationality could therefore be seen as the key making human beings justificatory beings, in that we both provide reasons for our actions and decisions, but also that we expect others to do the same. This equals to a large extent the Forstian formal criteria of reciprocity. I adopt the criteria of reciprocity and generality, and have previously tested to what extent they are applicable to the reasoning of state-representatives in foreign policy discourses, arguing that they are applicable, but need some revision\textsuperscript{21}.

The types of political decisions focused on as an example of political reasoning in this article are the ones leading up to states’ engagements in peacebuilding initiatives. That includes decisions and arguments articulated in states’ foreign policy discourses. This builds on previous research where arguments have been analyzed and assessed in relation to the practice of trying to justify certain political decisions\textsuperscript{22}.

To sum up, the position argued for here assumes that morality has a role to play within politics. In order to argue for this case, I position myself in a constructivist and Kantian tradition and make use of Kant’s metaphors of the moral politician and the political moralist and agree with his reasoning in favor for the moral politician. I also apply Forst’s reasoning of justificatory orders in order to provide a platform for discussing and assessing the forms of justificatory arguments offered in relation to political decisions. Further on, I articulate a conception of ethical, moral and pragmatic justification that has relevance for arguments provided for political decisions in states’ foreign policy. But let us first briefly discuss the issues of epistemology and political decisions.

**On justification: epistemology and political decisions**

The relationship between knowledge and politics has been portrayed as one of the main questions of contemporary democracy\textsuperscript{23}. Political decisions are based on arguments articulated in a political setting. This could be done either descriptively or normatively, i.e. it could be based on how things are or how things ought to be. When it comes to justification, or the justificatory attempts provided with the aim to justify an action or decision, this has to have a normative element embedded. Yet, a political setting could be both descriptive and normative, allowing for variation of the character of the arguments being offered for a particular decision.

Based on an earlier study, I argue that reciprocity and generality are crucial criteria for making assessments of the arguments being used to justify foreign policy decisions. These are, I would say, providing a framework for ethical justification. However, they are not enough for capturing the nuances in the political setting, as


\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

this is also influenced by pragmatic reasons and strategic interests. I argue that it makes sense to talk about different forms of justification and that these forms are located on different epistemological levels, as some make claims of validity, others truth, or neither of the two.

As briefly touched upon above, one variant of ethical justification is offered by Forst by his model of *the basic structure for justification* based on reciprocity and generality. When arguments, or justificatory attempts in my terminology, are reciprocal in that they are expected by others to be articulated and that others in turn provide justificatory attempts. They are general in that they are accessible for everyone else in a similar position. This provides a basic structure for justification, according to Forst. Generality implies that the reasons of generally valid basic norms must be sharable by all those affected. Reciprocity is divided in reciprocity of content and reciprocity of reasons, which according to Forst is referring to

> [...] that no one may refuse the particular demands of others that one raises for oneself (reciprocity of content), and that no one may simply assume that others have the same values and interests as oneself or make recourse to “higher truths” that are not shared (reciprocity of reasons).

In addition to reciprocity and generality, Forst also argues that the reasons provided should be relevant, so that they can be accepted by every moral person. This suggestively provides a model for ethical justification, according to the Grenholmian understanding of ethics and morality I adopt.

The distinction between the epistemological and the normative has potential implications for justification in at least two ways. First, justification can be seen as a concept with potential for epistemological discussion. Second, it can be either normative or descriptive, since these two often stand in contrast. This also has potential implications for the position of cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories in relation to justification. In brief, cognitivist theories argue that moral judgements provide knowledge about facts, and could therefore be true or false, and shown to be true or false. Non-cognitivist theories argue that arguments about the good and the right do not provide knowledge about facts, and that there is a crucial difference between moral judgements and facts. Hence, moral judgements cannot be true or false according to a non-cognitivist theory. Jürgen Habermas and Forst have been seen as cognitivists but they sometimes talk about validity and not truth. The understand-

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24 I develop the terminology of justificatory attempts or *attempts to justify* certain actions in my dissertation, see: *Ohlsson J.* On the Ethics of External States in Peacebuilding: A Critical Study of Justification. P. 123. Here I develop an understanding of *attempts to justify* as being of crucial importance for the connection between a theoretical and normative discussion of justification and the practice of providing justificatory arguments for engagement in peacebuilding activities in states’ foreign policy discourse.


26 Ibid. P. 6.


28 Ibid. P. 102.


ing of the epistemological underpinnings of justification adopted in this article is that justification concerns the practice of providing reasons which holds and are valid.

**Pragmatic, moral and ethical justification**

What seems to be a prerequisite for addressing justificatory attempts of political decisions and actions is a distinction between different forms of justification. When talking about justification, whether explicitly as in relation to political decisions in foreign policy, or in general, I argue for a distinction between three forms: pragmatic, moral and ethical justification. The difference between these has to do with which understanding of ethics and morality we are adopting. For example, scholars such as Grenholm have argued that ethics should be understood as the critique of morality, while morality is a social institution covering our different perceptions of what is right or wrong, good or bad. Others, such as Habermas, have argued for an understanding of ethics as primarily focused on a question of what is good, particularly for myself and my own community. This understanding of the good life seems often connected to different conceptions of life and different social communities. Important to note here is that “ethics” has a non-moral sense for Habermas, in accordance with the interpretation provided by Bohman and Rehg. They are arguing that Habermas “considers morality a matter of unconditional moral obligations: the prohibitions, positive obligations, and permissions that regulate interaction among persons.”

Previous scholars in justification theory, such as for example Habermas, have examined practical reason, particularly the pragmatic, ethical, and moral applications of practical reason. He argues for a separation between pragmatic, ethical, and moral aspects, linking this to a division between different more abstract forms of thought vs. a practical discourse. Habermas further argues that, based on the distinction between ethical and moral discourse, it lies within the framework of the moral discourse that universal moral judgments can be justified. I adopt parts of the categorization provided by Habermas, i.e. the division and terminology of pragmatic, ethical, and moral. However, the position defended in this article adopts the understanding of ethics and morality as explicated by Grenholm. This leads us to a definition of moral justification as the reasons for norms and actions that are appropriate, primarily concerning the rightness or wrongness about the reasons for the political decisions, while ethical justification is concerned about the principles governing the arguments provided.

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51 Elsewhere, I have used the terminology of political justification. (See: Ohlsson J. On the Ethics of External States in Peacebuilding: A Critical Study of Justification. P. 44, 101f, 128‒130). However, in order to be clear and consistent in the reasoning it makes sense to be clear about the utilization of the ‘political’ and what entails. This motivates revising the terminology and instead refer to pragmatic justification when addressing strategic choices reached through democratic deliberation.


Pragmatic justification, I understand as justificatory attempts motivated by practical, often strategic, political interests\textsuperscript{35}. In the Kantian terminology discussed above, this would be the kind of arguments that would be articulated by the political moralist. Yet, Forst’s understanding of political justification, as a legally institutionalized form of justification which equivalents justification that is constitutionally constructed, differs from this one.

**Justification and legitimation**

As argued for above, it is plausible to conceptualize justification as either pragmatic, moral or ethical. The justificatory attempts that can be found in foreign policy discourses show elements of all three forms of justification, but to a varying degree. In addition, the attempts to justify political decisions that can be found in states’ foreign policy has to some extent tended to be mixed up with the practices of legitimation. As this article conceptualizes pragmatic justification as providing practical or strategic reasons governed by the actors’ own interest, most commonly articulated in a political context and which often have direct relevance for political action, this sometimes seems parallel to the legitimation of political action. However, providing arguments as reasons for engagement in peacebuilding is not per se unmitigated justification since there are different types of arguments (some being justificatory attempts) provided for a particular political decision. Sometimes this assumes a shallow, more pragmatic and practically oriented understanding of justification, and occasionally it seems to be confused with legitimation\textsuperscript{36}.

Scholars have argued that much of the existing research on legitimation and legitimacy have recently broadened, this seems to have taken place in tandem with the increased scholarly focus on global governance, of which peacebuilding could be seen as part. It has additionally been argued that research on legitimation has been normative in its orientation, and largely taken place within political theory\textsuperscript{37}. Yet, that much legitimation research has been normative does not per se provide a connection to justification, even though there seems to be a few potential overlaps.

**On different forms of justification of political decisions**

To conclude, the position argued for in this article combines descriptive realism and normative non-realism in that it recognizes that power will be of crucial impor-

\textsuperscript{35} Political justification is providing pragmatic, practical reasons that have direct relevance for political action. This could be exemplified by the argument of the need of strategically ‘showing the flag’ when participating in peacebuilding. This sometimes seems to correlate with the legitimation of political action. Moral justification is on the other hand understood as the reasons for norms and actions that are morally approved. An example of this kind of justification is the references to human rights as an important end for the practices of peacebuilding.


tance in the political sphere, in particular in the relations between states. It also recognizes the role of morality in the reasoning leading to political decisions.

In relation to the question of whether it is reasonable to talk about different forms of justification or if such discussion undermines the notion itself, I would repeatedly argue that all forms of scrutiny of justification contribute to furthering our understanding of the notion. It is therefore of crucial importance to clarify and streamline the different nuances. Based on my reasoning, I argue that it is reasonable to talk about different forms of justification in relation to their applicability to political decisions. This is affected by the nature of political decisions as moral and ethical justification assumes that morality have a role to play in the shaping of political decisions. Pragmatic justification does not necessarily adopt reasons of moral or ethical character, but it does not reject them per se. This allows for a more nuanced discussion on the understanding of justificatory practices in relation to the argumentation leading up to political decisions. Based on the reasoning throughout the article, I defend an understanding where justificatory arguments for political decisions in foreign policy primarily should be scrutinized as different attempts toward justification.

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об этическом, моральном и прагматическом обосновании политических решений

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Каково разумное понимание различных форм обоснования и в какой степени они применимы к процессам, ведущим к принятию политических решений? Какова природа политических решений, подлежащих обоснованию, и какую роль в формировании этих решений может играть мораль, в особенности – в отношении доводов, предложенных в качестве аргументов в пользу вовлеченности внешней государственной политики в миротворчество? Для рассмотрения этих вопросов в статье используются концепции обоснования и в некоторой степени легитимации политических решений и действий. В частности, в статье обсуждается различие между прагматическим, моральным, этическим обоснованием и легитимацией. Показано, что прагматическое обоснование требует политического, или стратегического, подхода к обосновываемому решению, моральное обоснование касается правильности или неправильности оснований политических решений. Этическое же обоснование касается принципов, определяющих решения. В данной статье утверждается, что все три вида обоснования должны рассматриваться на различных уровнях.

Позиция, которая отстаивается в данной статье, основана на Кантовском подходе к обоснованию политических решений и апеллирует к аргументам Иммануила Канта, Юргена Хабермаса и Райнера Форста. Это позволяет подчеркнуть роль человека как рационального существа, а также принципы, лежащие в основе аргументов принятий решений вовлеченности в миротворчество. Основываясь на приводимых в статье рассуждениях, я отстаиваю то понимание, что аргументы в пользу политических решений во внешней политике прежде всего следует понимать как попытки прагматического и морального обоснования.

Ключевые слова: этическое, моральное и прагматическое обоснование, попытки обоснования, легитимация, политические решения